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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 900257-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RODNEY B. JENSEN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal following a conviction of possession
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990); possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1990) and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon,
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504
(1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly find that the

evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to convict defendant
of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990)?
The trial court's interpretation of section 58-37-8
poses a question of law reviewable for correctness.
Warner, 788 P.2d 1041, 1042 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

State v,

2.

Is defendant's sentence constitutionally

proportionate, under the eighth amendment, to the gravity of the
offense for which he was convicted?
This Court must grant substantial deference to the
legislature and the sentencing court, as
it is not the role of an appellate court to
substitute its judgment for that of the
sentencing court as to the appropriateness of
a particular sentence; rather# in applying
the Eighth Amendment the appellate court
decides only whether the sentence under
review is within constitutional limits.
Solem v. Helmf 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983);

State v. Bishop,

717 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 1986).
3.

Did the trial court properly sentence defendant to

the statutory indeterminate term of from zero to five years?
This Court will not set aside a sentence unless it
appears that the trial court abused its discretion, failed to
consider all legally relevant factors, or the sentence imposed
exceeded the limits prescribed by law.

State v. Gibbons, 779

P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Rodney B. Jensen, was charged with
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990); possession
of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1990) and carrying a concealed
dangerous weapon, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 76-10-504 (1990) (Record [hereinafter "R."] at 33).X
Defendant was convicted as charged following a jury trial on
September 25, 1989 (R. at 102).
On October 5, 1989, defendant was released on bail
pending imposition of sentence (R. at 136-37).

A bench warrant

was issued for defendant's arrest and his bail revoked on
November 9, 1989 after he failed to appear for a hearing (R. at
140-42).

Defendant subsequently appeared before the trial court

on November 20, 1989 at which time the court ordered a
presentence report (R. at 141). On December 12, 1989 defendant
appeared for sentencing and the court ordered a 90-day diagnostic
evaluation (R. at 146). Defendant filed a memorandum on March 3,
1990, requesting that he be placed on probation with the
requirement that he participate in counseling for his alcohol
and/or drug problem on the grounds that (1) the mitigating
factors outweighed aggravating factors in his case and (2) a
prison sentence would constitute cruel and unusual punishment (R.
at 153). Following completion of the 90-day evaluation on March
19, 1989, the trial court ordered defendant to be held in the Box
Elder County Jail pending sentencing (R. at 148, 152).

Defendant was originally charged with the above counts on
December 28, 1988 (R. at 2). In an amended information
subsequently filed January 23, 1989, count II (possession of drug
paraphernalia) was dropped and count III (carrying a concealed
dangerous weapon) was reduced to the class B misdemeanor of
carrying a loaded firearm (R. at 12). However, on March 1, 1989
the information was amended to again reflect the original charges
(R. at 33).
-3-

Defendant was sentenced on April 9, 1990 to a term of
not more than five years in the Utah State Prison for count I;
six months in the Box Elder County Jail for count II and one year
in the Box Elder County Jail for count III, all sentences to run
concurrently.

In addition, defendant was fined $2,000 and

ordered to pay a surcharge in the amount of $500 as well as
extradition costs as determined by the Adult Probation and Parole
Department (R. at 225-26).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was arrested on December 22, 1988 pursuant to
a bench warrant that had been issued for his arrest on December
9, 1988 and taken to the Tremonton City Police Department
(Transcript of jury trial, 9/25/89 [hereinafter M T. M ] at 13-15,
48-50).

During the course of a pat-down search incident to

defendant's arrest Officer Bill Beckmann discovered that
defendant, who was wearing a long overcoat at the time, was
carrying a .32 caliber automatic pistol in a hip holstejr (T. at
14-15).

A further search of defendant's jacket revealed a box of

.32 caliber cartridges in one pocket (R. at 14-17) and a brown
cotton bag in another pocket containing a metal straw, mirror,
razor blade and brown vial with a white powdery substance in it
(T. at 17, 20). 2

When Officer Beckmann discovered the brown cotton bag in
defendant's pocket he asked him what it contained and defendant
explained it was his first aid kit (T. at 17, 116). At trial
defendant testified that he put the brown cotton bag in his coat
and that he knew it contained a mirror, bottle and straw, but he
believed the bottle was empty at the time (T. at 112, 115).

-4-

A field test performed on a sample of the powdery
substance in the vial at the station revealed the possible
existence of a controlled substance (T. 22, 39/ 43). The brown
bag together with the vial, straw, mirror and razor blade were
then turned over to Arthur Terkelson at the Weber State College
Crime Lab for further testing (T. at 62-64).

Officer Beckmann

asked Terkelson to test for the presence of cocaine and
methamphetamine (T. at 44). Several tests were conducted on
samples taken from the vial and metal straw which revealed the
3
existence of methamphetamine (T. at 67-68, 74). Although
Terkelson did not weigh the exact amount of substance in the
vial, he estimated that it contained approximately 15 to 25
milligrams which constituted "more than just residue" because
4
"you can still pour some out" (T. at 75-76, 91-92).
Terkelson apparently obtained three different samples from the
vial (T. at 65-67). Using the first sample, he conducted a
cobalt thiocyanate test which was negative for the presence of
cocaine (T. at 66). He then took a second sample from the vial
and performed a marquis test which revealed the presence of
amphetamine (T. at 66-67). Finally, Terkelson apparently took a
third sample from the vial for purposes of conducting a gas
chromatograph which revealed the existence of methamphetamine (T.
at 67-69).
In addition to the vial samples, Terkelson obtained a sample
from residue remaining on both the metal straw and the mirror (T.
68, 88-89). A marquis test performed on the straw sample
revealed the presence of amphetamine (T. at 68, 88-89). Along
with the vial sample, the straw sample was then subjected to a
gas chromatograph and similarly tested positive for
methamphetamine (T. at 68, 89). Although Terkelson obtained a
sample from residue remaining on the mirror, it was simply not
enough to conduct a successful marquis test and was not subjected
to the more sensitive gas chromatograph test (T. at 89).
4
Terkelson surmised that the substance in the vial was probably
not 100% pure based on the fact that it appeared consistent with
illegal lab product (T. at 73, 83). Due to a number of varying
factors, Terkelson could not say with certainty that the

At the conclusion of all the evidence defendant made a
motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a controlled
substance on the ground that the amount was insufficient to
establish a third degree felony (T. at 119). The trial court
denied defendant's motion on the ground that the quantity of
methamphetamine in his possession was sufficient (T. at 121-122;
a copy of the trial court's oral findings is attached hereto as
Addendum A ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Relying primarily upon case law and policies expressly
rejected by this Court in State v. Warner/ 788 P.2d 1041 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990)f defendant argues that the 15 to 25 milligrams of
the controlled substance methamphetamine found in his possession
is simply insufficient to establish that his possession was
knowing and intentional.

Although this Court has rejected the

requirement of some specific "usable amount" in order to sustain
a conviction for possession, this Court has not expressly
considered whether possession of some particular quantity of
narcotics might nonetheless be necessary to justify a jury's
Cont. percentage of methamphetamine remaining in the vial was
sufficient to cause a physical effect in a particular instance;
however, he was certain that methamphetamine was present (T. at
74, 97-98).
On cross examination defense counsel asked the following
question: . . . .[W]e don't know how much real amphetamine may
be in this sample, but it's certainly less than 100 percent of 25
milligrams or 15 milligrams?" Terkelson responded: "Yes, I
would agree with that." Defense counsel then asked: "So we
could be — maybe as low as five to ten milligrams perhaps?"
Terkelson responded: "Perhaps" (T. at 92). Based on the
foregoing testimony it is clear that Terkelson's estimation of
five to ten milligrams went to the possible amount of amphetamine
contained in the approximately 15 to 25 milligrams of
methamphetamine he observed in the vial.
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conclusion that a defendant had knowledge of the presence and
narcotic character of the drug in his possession.
Upon review of pertinent case law it appears that the
quantity of controlled substance becomes vital only in the
absence of other evidence of intent.

See State v. Winters, 16

Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872, 873-74 (1964) (where drugs were
discovered inside mattress located in defendant's former cell the
Utah Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to justify the
jury's conclusion that defendant had knowledge of both his
possession and the narcotic effect of the drug without
considering the specific amount).

The evidence presented at

defendant's trial was sufficient to establish that he knowingly
and intentionally exercised dominion and control over the
methamphetamine found in his possession.

Defendant does not

dispute that he placed a brown bag containing a vial, metal straw
and mirror in his jacket pocket.

The vial contained a clearly

visible amount of approximately 15 to 25 milligrams of the
controlled substance methamphetamine.

Based on the foregoing

facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant exercised
a knowing and intentional possession.
Where, as here, the controlled substance is clearly
visible, some courts have found it unnecessary to consider
whether the record contained other evidence of a knowing and
intentional possession, relying solely on a visible amount of
controlled substance to establish the intent element of the
offense.

Under either view, the evidence in this case was

clearly sufficient to establish defendant's knowing and
intentional possession of the controlled substance

methamphetamine.
Alternatively, defendant attacks his sentence as being
cruel and unusual under the eighth amendment.

However, the

indeterminate term not to exceed five years which is applicable
to third degree felonies was clearly proportionate to the gravity
of defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled
substance.

Furthermore, defendant's sentence falls within

statutorily imposed limits and thus carries with it a strong
presumption of constitutionality.

Moreover, the record is devoid

of any indication that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying defendant's request to be placed on probation and
imposing the statutory term.

This Court should affirm the lower

court's ruling.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF A KNOWING
AND INTENTIONAL POSSESSION OF THE CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE METHAMPHETAMINE.
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled
substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(1987) which provides that it is unlawful "for any person
knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled
substance . . . ."

He was found to be in possession of a vial

containing approximately 15 to 25 milligrams of a white powdery
substance, as well as other drug paraphernalia including a metal
straw, mirror and razor blade (T. at 21, 75). Tests performed on
the substance in the vial and on residue collected from the metal
straw revealed the presence of the controlled substance

methamphetamine (T. 67-68/ 74-76/ 91). Defendant seeks reversal
on the ground that the amount of methamphetamine found in the
vial and metal straw was simply insufficient to demonstrate that
he knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance
(Br. of App. at 8-9). In support of his argument defendant urges
this Court to reconsider its recent opinion in State v. Warner#
788 P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)/ and adopt a minority view
which requires possession of a usable amount of a controlled
substance.
At the outset it is important to clarify Utah case law
on this issue.

In Warner, this Court rejected an interpretation

of section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) that would have required possession
of a "usable amount" to sustain a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance.

Id. at 1043-44 (section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)

does not require possession of a sufficient quantity of illegal
substance to cause a physical effect).

See State v. Winters# 16

Utah 2d 139/ 396 P.2d 872, (1964) (the determinative test in Utah
"is possession of a narcotic drug, and not usability of a
narcotic drug").

Although both this Court and the Utah Supreme

Court have clearly rejected the requirement of some specific
"usable amount" in order to sustain a conviction for possession/
neither Warner nor Winters expressly considered whether

Defendant places primary reliance on policies and case law
expressly rejected by this Court in Warner, 788 P.2d at 1042-43.
This position is consistent with the majority of jurisdictions.
Id. (citing People v. Harrington, 396 Mich. 33f 238 N.W.2d 20/ 25
(1976); Hampton v. State, 498 So.2d 384f 386 (Miss. 1986); People
v. Mizell/ 72 N.Y.2d 651/ 536 N.Y.S.2d 21/ 22-23/ 532 N.E.2d
1249/ 1250-51 (1988)).

possession of some particular quantity of narcotics might
nonetheless be necessary to justify a jury's conclusion that a
defendant had knowledge of the presence and narcotic cheiracter of
7
the drug in his possession.
Significantly, both Warner and
Winters acknowledge that "several courts have held that no
particular quantity of narcotics is necessary to sustain a
conviction for possession of a narcotic drug."

Warner, 788 P.2d

at 1043 (quoting Winters, 396 P.2d at 874). In support of this
position, this Court explained that "[e]ven in jurisdictions that
advance the majority view that any amount of illegal substance is
sufficient to make out the offense of possession, the prosecution
must still prove the essential element of knowledge."

Id. at

1043 n.3 (citing Harrington, 238 N.W.2d at 24 ("It is only when
these two requirements are present that an individual may be
found guilty of possession, even by applying the majority
rule")).

Thus, no particular amount of controlled substance is,

by itself, determinative of a knowing and intentional possession.
Id.

This precise question appears to have been left open by this
Court in Warner and by the Utah Supreme Court in Winters. In
Warner, this Court expressly noted that the defendant did not
argue that the State failed to prove he had knowledge of the
drug's presence and its narcotic character, or that a particular
minimum quantity of methamphetamine was necessary to prove that
he "knowingly and intentionally" possessed the drug. Therefore,
this Court's opinion was limited to a rejection of Warner's
narrow argument that section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) implied a "usable
amount" requirement. 1x1. at 1043. In Winters, the drugs were
discovered in defendant's former cell inside his mattress;
therefore, the Utah Supreme Court simply found the evidence
sufficient to justify the jury's conclusion that defendant had
knowledge of both his possession and the narcotic effect of the
drug. Winters, 396 P.2d at 873-74.

In Warner, this Court attempted to distinguish two
apparently differing views as to the State's burden of proof on
the issue of a knowing and intentional possession.

Ld. at 1043

q

n.3.

However, viewing the cases as a whole it appears that the

quantity of controlled substance becomes vital only in the
absence of other evidence of intent.

See, e.g., Benson, 509 P.2d

at 556 (when there is present in the record other evidence of
intent . . . . then all that is needed to sustain a conviction is
that amount of controlled substance necessary for
identification); Siirila, 193 N.W.2d at 473 (where traces of
marijuana were discovered in a jacket shown to belong to
defendant and to have been worn by him, court found that it was a
permissible inference that whatever was in the jacket was there
with his knowledge); Theel, 505 P.2d at 965 (where less than a
milligram of marijuana was found in three clear plastic baggies
located in pocket of jacket defendant had borrowed from a friend,
Without expressing a preference for either view this Court
noted:
Some jurisdictions advocate that since
knowledge may be proven by circumstantial
evidence, possession alone of a trace or
minute quantity of contraband infers
knowledge. See e.g., State v. Siirila, 292
Minn. 1, 193 N.W.2d 467, 473 (1971), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 925, 92 S.Ct. 2503, 33
L.Ed.2d 336 (1972); People v. Mizell# 72
N.Y.2d 651, 536 N.Y.S.2d 21, 24, 532 N.E.2d
1249, 1252 (1988). However, other courts
have found, to the contrary, that possession
of a minute amount of illegal drugs alone, is
insufficient to justify an inference of
knowledgeable possession. See e.g., State v.
Theel, 180 Colo. 348, 505 P.2d 964, 965-66
(1973) (en banc); People v. Hunten, 115
Mich.App. 167, 320 N.W.2d 68, 70 (1982) (per
curiam); Sheriff, Clark County v. Benson/ 89
Nev. 160, 509 P.2d 556 (1973).
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court found that the record failed to reveal any evidence
establishing the element of knowledge); Hunten, 320 N.W.2d at 70
(court found that the amount of controlled substance was not
visible to the naked eye and that there was nothing in the record
from which an inference could be drawn that defendant was aware
g
of the substance).
See Winters, 396 P.2d at 873-74 (where drugs
were discovered inside mattress located in defendant's former
cell the Utah Supreme Court simply found the evidence sufficient
to justify the jury's conclusion that defendant had knowledge of
both his possession and the narcotic effect of the drug).

See

also Judd v. State, 482 P.2d 273, 280 (Alaska 1971) (where facts
show knowing possession it is unnecessary that a usable amount
quantity be found).
In the present case, it is clear from the record that
defendant was knowingly and intentionally in possession of the
controlled substance methamphetamine.

The vial was located

inside defendant's jacket pocket and contained a clearly visible
amount of approximately 15 to 20 milligrams of methamphetamine

The Hunten court's determination that there was nothing in the
record from which an inference of knowledgeable possession could
be drawn overlooks the fact that the substance was taken from
drug paraphernalia found inside a secret compartment that had
been built into the tongue of defendant's shoe while he was an
inmate at the Muskegon Correctional Facility. Id. at 68.
Where the controlled substance is determined to be clearly
visible, some courts hold that there is a sufficient amount to
infer a knowing and intentional possession. Harrington, 238
N.W.2d at 27 (mens rea threshold was successfully crossed where
defendant was found in possession of bottle caps with white
heroin encrustation apparent to the naked eye); Mizell, 532
N.E.2d at 1250 (court inferred knowing possession where defendant
was found in possession of two vials containing visible cocaine
residue).
-12-

(T. at 75, 109-112).

In addition, defendant admits that he put

the brown bag in his jacket pocket and that he knew the bag
contained a mirror, vial and straw (T. at 109-112).

He further

admits that he didn't think there was anything in the bottle at
the time because he "could have" ingested its contents previously
(T. at 112-115).

Thus, a jury could reasonably conclude from the

above facts that defendant knowingly and intentionally exercised
dominion and control over the methamphetamine in the vial.

See

Winters, 396 P.2d at 874 (State "must prove that the accused
exercised dominion and control over the drug with knowledge of
its presence and narcotic character").
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE DOES NOT IMPLICATE THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
Defendant argues that it was cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution for the trial court to impose a statutory
indeterminate term not to exceed five years "for an offense
involving an unusable and valueless amount of methamphetamine"
(Br. of App. at 19). Defendant's argument is without merit.
In State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 1986), the
Utah Supreme Court applied a proportionality test to determine
whether the sentence imposed was proportionate to the crime for
which the defendant had been convicted.

In so doing, the court

The court balanced three factors in its analysis:
(i) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same

-13-

noted that "[o]nly rarely will a statutorily prescribed
punishment be so disproportionate to the crime that the
sentencing statute is unconstitutional."

Jd.

Because

"sentencing statutes are necessarily based on numerous, imprecise
considerations," in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the
Supreme Court stated that "substantial deference must be accorded
to the prerogatives of legislative power in 'determining the
types and limits of punishments for crimes.'"

^Id. (quoting Solem

v. Helmf 463 U.S. at 290).
In the present case, this Court must grant substantial
deference to the trial court's imposition of the statutorily
mandated sentence.

Defendant was found guilty of possession of

approximately 15 to 25 milligrams of the controlled substance
methamphetamine, 12 possession of which amount the legislature has
classified as a third degree felony.13 Clearly, defendant's
sentence falls within prescribed statutory limits and thus
carries a strong presumption of constitutionality.

United States

v. Newsome, 898 F.2d 119, 122 (10th Cir.) (noting that within the
strictures of the eighth amendment the determination of proper

Cont. jurisdiction; and (iii) the
sentences imposed for the commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions.
Id. (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)).
12
13

See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(B) (1990).

See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii) (1990). See also Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (1990) authorizing imposition of an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years for conviction of a
third degree felony. Under Utah's Sentence and Release
Guidelines, defendant could be eligible for parole after having
served only six months of his sentence, or at the latest after
having served only 18 months. See form 4, appendix H.

criminal penalties is a matter for legislative bodies and a
sentence within the prescribed statutory limits generally will
not be found to be cruel and unusual), cert* denied,

U.S.

, 111 S.Ct. 207 (1990).
Notwithstanding the above, defendant appears to argue
that because the use of illegal substances is prevalent in our
society, no useful purpose is served by imprisoning arguably
casual drug offenders and thus the harshness of his prison
sentence is disproportionate to the gravity of his possession
conviction (Br. of App. at 20). Contrary to defendant's
assertion, imposition of an indeterminate term not to exceed five
years is clearly proportionate to the gravity of the crime for
which he was convicted. 14 As noted in point I of this brief,
this Court expressly rejected a policy argument similar to that
of the defendants in Warner when it refused to read a "usability
requirement" into Utah's Controlled Substances Act.

Id. at 1043

(rejecting rationale that possession of quantities too small to
be used do not pose the type of danger the legislature
contemplated).

Other courts similarly recognize that drug

Because defendant's argument appears to focus solely on the
first of three factors for determining proportionality set forth
in Bishop, 717 P.2d at 269, the State likewise limits its
analysis of defendant's claims to a consideration of whether the
gravity of the offense is proportionate to the harshness of the
penalty and assumes defendant has no concerns regarding the
sentences imposed on other criminals in this jurisdiction or the
sentences imposed for possession of a controlled substance in
other jurisdictions. See Br. of App. at 18-19.
15

Significantly, this Court upheld section 58-37-8(5)(a)(iii) of
the Controlled Substances Act as constitutional when it was
challenged on equal protection and due process grounds in State
v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 60 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 795
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). The section provides enhanced penalties

offenses are at the root of some of the gravest problems facing
our country and note the existence of a strong public policy
against the illegal use of controlled substances.

See, e.g..

United States v. Meirovitz, 918 F.2d 1376, 1381 (8th Cir. 1990);
Newsome, 898 F.2d at 122 (noting the concerns of Congress and
society about drugs); State v. Wise, 164 Ariz. 574, 795 P.2d 217,
219 (Ariz. App.) (noting existence of strong public comiriitment to
eradicating the use of illicit drugs), review denied,

Ariz.

(1990); State v. Anderson, 210 N.J.Super 669, 510 A.2d 332
(N.J. Super. L. 1986) (finding rational legitimate basis in
regulatory purposes for dissuading possession and use of drugs
while operating motor vehicle).

In light of the Utah

legislature's obvious and legitimate concern with prohibiting
possession of even minute amounts of illicit drugs, together with
the fact that defendant's sentence falls within legislatively
prescribed limits, his sentence simply fails to "shock the moral
sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under
the circumstances."

State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah

1990) (setting forth test for determining whether punishment is
cruel and unusual in specific applications).
Alternatively, defendant appears to assert that the
trial court failed to afford proper weight to certain factors
mitigating in favor of his being placed on probation.

He further

asserts that the presentence report was "flawed and erroneous."
15
Cont. for convicted drug offenders, whether trafficking or
not, where the offenses occur in close proximity to schools. In
upholding the section this Court noted that it was reasonably
related to the legislative purpose of creating a drug-free
environment around school children. Id. at 59-60.
-16-

As a result, defendant argues, he "received a much harsher
sentence than would be warranted by the objective facts of his
background and criminal history" (Br. of App. at 18-19).
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that a
reviewing court will not overturn the sentence imposed by a lower
court unless the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, the
lower court failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or
the sentence exceeds statutorily imposed limits.

State v.

Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted).
See United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 870 (10th Cir.) (noting
that an appellate court is without the proper authority to modify
or change a sentence merely upon the claim that it is too
severe), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986).
In the present case, although defendant attacks the
criteria the trial court allegedly relied upon in imposing
sentence at the sentencing hearing, he has failed to include a
transcript of his sentencing hearing in the record before this
Court for review.

Nor has he provided a copy of his

presentence report.

The record before this Court is otherwise

devoid of any indication that the trial court employed improper
assumptions, mechanically imposed sentence or refused to exercise
its discretion to individualize defendant's sentence.

United

States v. Bonilla Romero, 836 F.2d 39, 47 (1st Cir.) (where

Although it is apparent from the record that defendant
requested and the trial court ordered preparation of the
sentencing transcript to be included in the record on appeal, the
sentencing transcript has not been included in the record before
this Court. See R. at 232, 251.

sentence imposed was not grossly disproportionate to the crime
committed and was within statutory limits, court found no abuse
of discretion), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).

Where, as

here, the defendant has failed to see that the record contains
materials necessary to support his appeal, this Court must assume
the regularity of the proceedings below and affirm the trial
court's ruling.

State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985);

State v. Theison# 709 P.2d 307, 309 (1985) (when crucial matters
are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed
to support the action of the trial court). 17 Thus, based on the
record before this Court, it is reasonable to conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant
to the statutory indeterminate term not to exceed five years.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State of Utah respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and
sentence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this &?tO day of February, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Utah Attorney General
MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
17
However, notwithstanding the above, the record before this
Court provides an adequate factual basis for the sentence
imposed. On October 5, 1989, defendant was released on bail
pending imposition of sentence (R. at 136-37). After defendant
failed to appear for a hearing, a bench warrant was issued for
his arrest and his bail revoked on November 9, 1989 (R. at 14042). Based on defendant's demonstrated inability to comply with
the conditions of his bail agreement, it cannot reasonably be
argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
defendant's request that he be placed on probation in lieu of
serving the statutory term.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
John D. Russell, 10 West Broadway, Suite 500, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84101, on this ^ t ^ d a y of February, 1991.

-20-

ADDENDUM A

121
1

THE COURTS

MR. MILLER.

2

MR. MILLER!

WITH REGARD TO THE POSSESSION OF

3

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE A MINIMUM

4 AMOUNT OF A SUBSTANCE THAT A PERSON MUST POSSESS IN ORDER TO
5

BE GUILTY.

THERE ARE OTHER CHARGES WHICH DO SET A STANDARD OF

6 POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, WHICH CAN BE ESTABLISHED
7

BY POSSESSION OF A CERTAIN QUANTITY, BUT THE SIMPLE POSSESSION

8 DOES NOT REQUIRE A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF SUBSTANCE IN ORDER TO BE
9 FOUND GUILTY.

ANY AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE DETERMINED BY

10 SCIENTIFIC TESTS TO CONTAIN THE SUBSTANCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
11
12

ESTABLISH THE CHARGE.

I WOULD SUBMIT IT ON THAT.

WITH REGARD TO THE FIREARM CHARGE, ONCE AGAIN,

13 WITH THE INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE.

I DISAGREE

THE STATUTE CLEARLY

14 MAKES IT A CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR TO CARRY A LOADED FIREARM
15 CONCEALED ON —

ANYWHERE, BUT IN THIS CASE ON HIS PERSON.

AND

16 THE FACT THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN OUT OF THE CAR EXCEPT FOR
17 THE OFFICER TELLING HIM TO GET OUT OF THE CAR DOESN'T MAKE IT
18 ANY LESS OF A CRIME.
19

IT WAS A CRIME WHEN HE WAS IN THE CAR IF

IT WAS CONCEALED AND LOADED.

THE ONLY WAY THAT IT COULD HAVE

20 NOT BEEN A CRIME WAS TO HAVE BEEN UNLOADED, AND BEEN IN A
21

SECURE PACKAGE OR PARCEL.

IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A CLASS "B"

22 MISDEMEANOR HAD IT BEEN UNLOADED, BUT IT WAS AND CONCEALED.
23 BUT BECAUSE IT WAS CONCEALED AND BECAUSE IT WAS LOADED, IT'S A
24 CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR.
25

THE COURTS

AND I SUBMIT IT ON THAT.

AS TO YOUR FIRST MOTION, COUNSEL, THE

122
1

COURT'S NOT PREPARED TO SAY THAT QUANTITY IS INSUFFICIENT AS A

2

MATTER OF LAW.

3

WHERE THE ENTIRE QUANTITY WAS USED UP IN THE ANALYSIS AND THE

4

COURT STILL HELD THAT IT'S SUFFICIENT TO SHOW POSSESSION.

5

THIS CASE, IT'S SIGNIFICANTLY MORE THAN THAT.

6

TESTIMONY THAT THERE IS ENOUGH OF A QUANTITY STILL REMAINING,

7

THAT IT'S IDENTIFIABLE, AND IT ISN'T JUST ON THE PERIPHERY

8

EDGE OF THE GLASS, I THINK THE TESTIMONY IS THAT WHAT KIND OF

9

—

THE COURT'S FAMILIAR PERSONALLY WITH CASES

IN

IN VIEW OF THE

WHAT KIND OF OR EVEN THE OBTAINING OF A HIGH WOULD DEPEND

10

ON A NUMBER OF FACTORS, THE PURITY, THE QUANTITY, AND ALSO THE

11

RECIPIENT.

12

MOTION ON THE BASIS THAT THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS ADDUCED AT

13

TRIAL AND THE EVIDENCE ALL BEING IN AT THIS POINT.

SO THE COURT'S REALLY NOT PREPARED TO GRANT A

14

AS TO THE CONCEALED WEAPON QUESTION, I THINK THERE MAY OR

15

MAY NOT HAVE BEEN A CRIME EARLIER IN THE CAR, DEPENDING ON HOW

16

THE FACTS WERE INTERPRETED AT THAT TIME.

17

EVIDENCE BEFORE THE JURY IN THIS COURT IS, WHAT HAPPENED

18

OUTSIDE OF THE CAR, AND I THINK THERE IS SUFFICIENT FOR A JURY

19

TO MAKE A DETERMINATION ONE WAY OR ANOTHER ON THE RELEVANT

20

FACTS THERE OF —

21

VEHICLE WAS —

22

SOMETHING FOR THE JURY TO —

23

BOTH OF YOUR MOTIONS.

24

MR. MILLER:

NO.

25

THE COURTS

ALL RIGHT.

BUT THE ONLY

ONE, OF THEM BEING WHETHER OR NOT THAT

THAT WEAPON WAS LOADED.

SO I THINK THERE IS

TO ADDRESS IN THAT, SO I'LL DENY

ANYTHING FURTHER?

LET'S GO BACK OUT.

